Which versions of pylogora are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of pylogora are flagged malicious: 0.7.8. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate pylogora if I installed it?

pylogora is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed pylogora — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If pylogora was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is pylogora part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — pylogora is associated with the 2026-07-tennacity, IN-MAL-2026-010715 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find pylogora across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pylogora (version 0.7.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pylogora across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

pylogoraPyPI

pylogora is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-10689) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.7.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in pylogora (PyPI)

MAL-2026-10689

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall pylogora

What this malware does

pylogora/init.py invokes _a() at module top level, so any import pylogora triggers the payload. _a() base64-decodes hidden URLs and filesystem paths, branches on OS and CPU architecture, downloads a native binary from easyswasnow.pro (Linux amd/arm and macOS amd/arm variants under /downloads/) or from a Google Drive file (Windows, id 1d4zF8lnDaYCgzRrEx3WCyLTFZXVD2QBF), writes it to a hidden staging path (~/.local/share/config on Linux, /Users/Shared/.local/config on macOS, %TEMP%\t.jse run via cscript on Windows), chmods it executable, strips the macOS quarantine attribute via xattr, and executes it. It then installs persistence: a systemd user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/python-script.service enabled with systemctl --user enable --now, or a LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.script.plist loaded with launchctl load -dw, causing the package's file to re-execute on every login. All URLs, destination paths, unit/plist bodies, argv strings, and the User-Agent are base64-encoded and decoded through a _b() helper to conceal intent. The declared purpose is a logging library, which has no need to fetch or execute native binaries from an anonymous host.

The typosquatted package installs a Mythic/Poseidon C2 framework beacon and ensures persistence. After installation, the beacon communicates with C2 on wegoexchange[.]site for further commands.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-tennacity

Reasons (based on the campaign):

typosquatting
Downloads and executes a remote executable.
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
malware
persistence

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.7.8

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

b01e8dfbdf9823541eee73bd52086cac9e0ea70246992afe74873372b5d6a293

dfecc686b83d148b0b68acd99fe38f484c035c5b9c59fb7623378866e8e307cc

ea86d2588d993bec6a9b8307028bb7be0b39c83a47b25e8299bdf182da874add

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pylogora (version 0.7.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pylogora across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pylogora is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pylogora was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pylogora before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. pylogora on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.7.8 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-07-tennacityIN-MAL-2026-010715

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks pylogora-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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