Which versions of pylogkt are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of pylogkt are flagged malicious: 0.1.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate pylogkt if I installed it?

pylogkt is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed pylogkt — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If pylogkt was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is pylogkt part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — pylogkt is associated with the 2026-05-lognest, IN-MAL-2026-004564 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find pylogkt across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pylogkt (version 0.1.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pylogkt across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

pylogktPyPI

Malicious code in pylogkt (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4291

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall pylogkt

What this malware does

The package masquerades as a logging utility but every call to its logging API (log.info/debug/etc) triggers Logger._log, which on macOS hosts (paths starting with /Users or /Library) silently spawns a detached subprocess running pylogkt/_check.py. That script self-deletes from disk (os.remove(file)), then enters an infinite 60-second polling loop against https://pypkg.dev/project/pylogkt/json with TLS verification disabled (ssl._create_unverified_context()). The first POST exfiltrates the absolute install path (base_dir.encode()), revealing the victim's username and site-packages layout. Subsequent responses are base64-decoded and passed to os.system via pip show <data>; the shell-escape filter allows ;, |, &, (, ), and >, making arbitrary command injection trivial. The C2 host pypkg.dev typosquats pypi.org and uses a /project/<pkg>/json path that mimics PyPI's real JSON API to camouflage the traffic. This is a full-fidelity backdoor: persistent C2, self-evidence-deletion, disabled TLS, and remote command execution on the installer's machine.

Package silently executes remote code during import.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-05-lognest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

90888c84173734fb54c893b2634d4d96c6fca8a04e0cbde4ca8e39ec1878b1bc

a477e4b644651b855ab6d0568792cc1ce87910245e26752df47377ac9f4ebb86

aa1c9e5bf0ffd994f076a4a76395b5bcccd2716229439910912bd49aaf52f903

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pylogkt (version 0.1.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pylogkt across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pylogkt is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pylogkt was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pylogkt before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. pylogkt on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-05-lognestIN-MAL-2026-004564

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst

Detect & block this

O3 blocks pylogkt-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring