pydanticcPyPI
pydanticc is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-13489) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.1.1, 0.1.2, 0.2.0…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in pydanticc (PyPI)
What this malware does
pydanticc is a typosquat of the popular 'pydantic' package. Its setup.py defines a custom setuptools install command whose body is stored as a base64 string literal and reconstituted at install time via base64.b64decode + compile + exec, concealing the payload from plain reading of setup.py. On Linux, the decoded hook downloads an opaque executable from https://github.com/totti2188/8gp1Q7iZD3h4VW/releases/download/v1.3A/something (a personal GitHub account unrelated to the package's stated purpose), writes it to /tmp/something, marks it executable, and launches it detached via subprocess.Popen with start_new_session=True. The shipped Python module (djangoo/main.py) contains only a trivial hello() print with no pydantic-related functionality, so the package's real effect on installation is arbitrary remote code execution on the installer's host. The unpinned personal-account release URL, base64/exec obfuscation of the URL and Popen call, detached background execution, name-squat of a top-100 package, and stub content together constitute a classic install-time dropper.
Package imitates name of a popula library. During installation, obfuscated code downloads a malicious executable and starts it. It then exfiltrates at least cryptocurrency wallet data, probably more.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-08-flasq
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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typosquatting
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
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exfiltration-generic
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
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obfuscation
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exfiltration-crypto
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pydanticc (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pydanticc across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pydanticc is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pydanticc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pydanticc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pydanticc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.