pyapiepoPyPI
Malicious code in pyapiepo (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Campaign is split into multiple packages that altogether exfiltrates data from desktop Telegram application.
- "pyapiepo" is a cover package that provides some useless features BUT also imports "zscaner"
- "zscaner", when imported, automatically runs a function that is an entry point to the whole process; it uses the "scan" from "reqinstall" to walk through directories. The package also provides main logic: filtering files, triggering archiving directories and exfiltrating them.
- "reqinstall" ensures "requests" are installed and provides a directory tree scanning function.
- "zmaker" provides functions to build archives from collected files.
- "zsender" provides functions to exfiltrate data, the remote URL and a function to deobfuscate configuration in other packages.
Altogether, they look for "Telegram Desktop" folder, archive user data stored there and exfiltrate to a remote location.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2025-04-zscaner
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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target:telegram
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exfiltration-generic
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The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pyapiepo (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pyapiepo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pyapiepo is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pyapiepo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pyapiepo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pyapiepo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.