py-base58PyPI
py-base58 is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-10193) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 2.1.3, 2.1.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in py-base58 (PyPI)
What this malware does
py-base58 2.1.3 masquerades as a pure-Python base58 encoder but on first import of the top-level base58 package decodes a ~640KB base64-embedded Linux ELF binary from base58/_payload.py, writes it to ~/.config/.npm-cache/ under a name masquerading as a system daemon (e.g. systemd-journald, nvidia-persistenced, docker-containerd), chmods it 0777, launches it, and installs a user crontab entry re-executing it every 12 hours. The init.py hook then removes the package's own.dist-info/.egg-info directories from site-packages so pip list and pip show no longer reveal the package. Strings in the dropped binary identify it as a cryptocurrency-wallet stealer targeting BIP-39 mnemonics and keystore files for Phantom, MetaMask, Ledger, and Exodus, and paths including ~/.config/solana/id.json, ~/.ethereum/keystore, and ~/.foundry/keystores; harvested material is encrypted to an embedded attacker RSA public key and uploaded to public file hosts api.pinata.cloud (IPFS pinning), uguu.se, temp.sh, and transfer.sh. The package's declared purpose (base58 encoding) has no legitimate need to drop a native binary, schedule cron persistence, or scrub its own installation metadata.
The package embeds an executable stealing cryptocurrency wallets data. During import, code saves the executable under a name suggesting system utility and configures cron to run it periodically. The exfiltrated data is encrypted using embedded RSA code before uploading to file-sharing services or IPFS.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-py-base58
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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crypto-related
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exfiltration-crypto
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persistence
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for py-base58 (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging py-base58 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
py-base58 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If py-base58 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks py-base58 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks py-base58-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.