Which versions of polyutil are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of polyutil are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate polyutil if I installed it?

polyutil is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed polyutil — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If polyutil was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is polyutil part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — polyutil is associated with the 2026-02-magichat campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find polyutil across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polyutil (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polyutil across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

polyutilPyPI

Malicious code in polyutil (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-928

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall polyutil

What this malware does

The package is prepared to download a hardcoded executable and save it in %LOCALAPPDATA% under a very generic name, clearly aiming to hide its existence. Code is also prepared to alter MarkOfTheWeb, start as admin and run the executable, but in analyzed versions this behavior was not triggered in any existing code path. The downloading will happen e.g. on starting the declared command line.

Remote executables are standalone applications or installators, including ClickOnce installators. However, in the analysis attempts, none of them showed clear malicious behavior, in most cases crashing during the analysis. Captured network traffic shows communication with the remote server and likely expects the URL of the next stage, which was not delivered from the server. Additionally, the code embeds a separate path for execution on non-Windows machines. It attempts to execute a remote script, but in analyzed versions, the domain used is already suspended and not reachable.

In newer packages the remote code is another downloader, which then downloads a PyInstaller-packed executable that just calls back home but has no more functionality.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-02-magichat

Reasons (based on the campaign):

Downloads and executes a remote executable.
other
typosquatting

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

31a0fc68eee0841a78740fd3e3748171612b871b58bf9f3e52b4fa35bed64774

ced0763b255a5c499d7346f2b2567b34069021fc7be38bcb455ebdaca93aab72

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polyutil (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polyutil across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polyutil is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If polyutil was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polyutil before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. polyutil on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-02-magichat

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks polyutil-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring