Which versions of piano-transcription are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of piano-transcription are flagged malicious: 912.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate piano-transcription if I installed it?

piano-transcription is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed piano-transcription — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If piano-transcription was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is piano-transcription part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — piano-transcription is associated with the RLMA-2024-11115, 2024-11-byted-dast, RLUA-2026-00590 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find piano-transcription across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for piano-transcription (version 912.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging piano-transcription across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

piano-transcriptionPyPI

Malicious code in piano-transcription (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-11658

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall piano-transcription

What this malware does

A campaign of probably pentest packages flooding PYPI. Installing the package or importing the module triggers reporting basic info like hostname, path and the username to the package author. There is no other purpose of the package.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: 2024-11-byted-dast

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
typosquatting
dependency-confusion

Malicious versions

1 flagged

912.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9e69dd6490a3ba179952a99e0909d95c6f89eda2b4b9d751f873b7462f3e7c45

935e4aa9b2482820e905862c5d766af115ccb1da5a22fa7f58a15cadd8e5d59f

24b4aad71a939a3b0490ea311a1e5959e26143a2de6e5eac9a4417bb6b82eb94

15ec8f98e61df8b84df2b3ecd3ef5bd0730877973e0de6b13857ed9b6e35c0c8

9ca19c2bf30263426e4f7a721eaaa775f83a4237c6d08a52924249d3ec714bc7

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for piano-transcription (version 912.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging piano-transcription across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
piano-transcription is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If piano-transcription was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks piano-transcription before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. piano-transcription on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 912.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2024-111152024-11-byted-dastRLUA-2026-00590

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks piano-transcription-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring