Which versions of phenopacket-store-toolkit are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of phenopacket-store-toolkit are flagged malicious: 0.1.7. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate phenopacket-store-toolkit if I installed it?

phenopacket-store-toolkit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed phenopacket-store-toolkit — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If phenopacket-store-toolkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is phenopacket-store-toolkit part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — phenopacket-store-toolkit is associated with the 2026-06-compr-woodpecker, IN-MAL-2026-008916 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find phenopacket-store-toolkit across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for phenopacket-store-toolkit (version 0.1.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging phenopacket-store-toolkit across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious packageDiscovered by O3 Security

phenopacket-store-toolkitPyPI

Malicious code in phenopacket-store-toolkit (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5322

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall phenopacket-store-toolkit

What this malware does

The package phenopacket-store-toolkit version 0.1.7 contains a malicious .pth file (phenopacket_store_toolkit-setup.pth) that executes a Bun-based credential stealer on every Python startup via CPython's site.py exec() mechanism. The payload downloads the Bun runtime from the official GitHub release page, then runs an obfuscated JavaScript stealer that exfiltrates environment variables, .env files, SSH keys, and cloud credentials to an attacker-controlled GitHub repository. This is part of the Hades/Miasma campaign (also called Shai-Hulud), attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor.

Novel finding: gpsea/_index.js (same campaign) embeds CBRN-level dangerous-content text to trigger AI safety refusals in LLM-based security scanners, causing them to skip the file entirely.

C2 IP: 20.207.73.82 Sentinel file: /tmp/.bun_ran MITRE ATT&CK: T1546.018

The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code

Versions 0.1.7 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

compromised-package
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-credentials
abuses-pth
obfuscation
infostealer
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
exfiltration-crypto
files-exfiltration
destructive-actions

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

5c1cff451aae02445a016621a9e769af3e154bf0d1f308739b24f0f96d3f309a

cb4e313f217cfa4681e9b2369626f20c4ce3c45e678134e31182374f4f36fd09

d88bfb8705da69b9a44ebbd6eee159150da48133788ed5134ee9d25dee170928

b94741b181d86c9649d6c3cf46bfc0bdaa9cbc8c7e1e492d500079aa3909aec5

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for phenopacket-store-toolkit (version 0.1.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging phenopacket-store-toolkit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
phenopacket-store-toolkit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If phenopacket-store-toolkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks phenopacket-store-toolkit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. phenopacket-store-toolkit on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-008916

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst
O3 Security · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks phenopacket-store-toolkit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database