Which versions of pantheon-toolsets are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of pantheon-toolsets are flagged malicious: 0.5.5, 0.5.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate pantheon-toolsets if I installed it?

pantheon-toolsets is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed pantheon-toolsets — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If pantheon-toolsets was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is pantheon-toolsets part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — pantheon-toolsets is associated with the 2026-06-compr-woodpecker, IN-MAL-2026-005837, IN-MAL-2026-009500 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find pantheon-toolsets across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pantheon-toolsets (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pantheon-toolsets across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

pantheon-toolsetsPyPI

Malicious code in pantheon-toolsets (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5277

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall pantheon-toolsets

What this malware does

The wheel installs pantheon_toolsets-setup.pth, which Python automatically executes at every interpreter startup (before any user import). The.pth contains a single obfuscated line using single-letter underscore-prefixed identifiers (_O, _T, _G, _o, _s, _u, _b, _a, _m, _z,...) and wraps the payload inside exec() of a string literal — a shape that has no legitimate use in a.pth file (which is normally limited to plain import statements / sys.path entries). The exec'd code: (1) checks a sentinel /tmp/.bun_ran to ensure one-shot execution, (2) downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip into /tmp/b/bun, (3) glob-searches the install tree for any _index.js file, and (4) runs it via subprocess with bun run <globbed_index.js>. The package is advertised as a Python AI-agent toolset and has no documented need for an alternate JavaScript runtime. The globbed _index.js payload is not declared in the wheel manifest and is fetched/staged opaquely, so the bytes ultimately executed are not auditable from the package metadata. Additional tampering fingerprint: the 0.5.5 RECORD references a 0.5.4 dist-info directory and lists its own RECORD with the empty-string SHA-256 and zero size, consistent with a malicious file appended to an otherwise legitimate build by someone with publish credentials. Installing this package causes arbitrary attacker-stageable code to run with the user's privileges every time python is invoked.

Versions 0.5.5, 0.5.6 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

compromised-package
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-credentials
abuses-pth
obfuscation
infostealer
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
exfiltration-crypto
files-exfiltration
destructive-actions

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.5.50.5.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9c9711927907f09a0ef2b146d3aba3b8a06197b9af3f639d579015cdab7c0d5d

da03533f5773391b407c22d0024023d206ae96cea73fcd0d05cb2e0b5559e4dc

d3b47973a9df4b3f64f94ea3d91063d428a7212d369981f036301c5aadc4e2ac

43606844907760e50b0a368f20365dc747287c3a73ce5d4b4426f575d852e059

a3f2d24843d0caf23a36f07f7bd7b3adb7163463404856654f1745c7e75017be

1120ada39a23fab4d14e1b9c7c0487be71acfbb588ba793f42ae117e418a6e0a

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pantheon-toolsets (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pantheon-toolsets across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pantheon-toolsets is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pantheon-toolsets was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pantheon-toolsets before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. pantheon-toolsets on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.5.5, 0.5.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-005837IN-MAL-2026-009500

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks pantheon-toolsets-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring