Which versions of pantheon-agents are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of pantheon-agents are flagged malicious: 0.6.1, 0.6.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate pantheon-agents if I installed it?

pantheon-agents is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed pantheon-agents — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If pantheon-agents was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is pantheon-agents part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — pantheon-agents is associated with the 2026-06-compr-woodpecker, IN-MAL-2026-006183 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find pantheon-agents across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pantheon-agents (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pantheon-agents across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

pantheon-agentsPyPI

Malicious code in pantheon-agents (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5299

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall pantheon-agents

What this malware does

The package installs pantheon_agents-setup.pth into site-packages, which Python auto-executes at every interpreter startup (broader than import-time, fires on any python invocation regardless of whether the package is imported). The single-line.pth body wraps its payload in exec() of an obfuscated string using systematically renamed single-letter aliased imports (os as _O, tempfile as _T, urllib.request as _u, subprocess as _s, platform as _p, etc.), which hides urllib.request.urlretrieve, zipfile extraction, os.chmod, and subprocess.run from static AST inspection. The payload downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it 0o775, and runs it against a _index.js file resolved by glob across pantheon/*/_index.js. A sentinel file at /tmp/.bun_ran gates re-execution. Two compounding harms: (1) Python startup performs unconditional outbound network fetch and writes/executes a fetched binary outside Python's view — the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern; (2) any sibling package (or future update) that drops a file at pantheon/*/_index.js is silently executed by the dropped Bun binary at every Python startup, providing a persistent execution sink. The combination of .pth auto-execution, exec()-wrapped obfuscation, and remote-runtime fetch+execute is a textbook supply-chain-attack fingerprint.

Versions 0.6.1, 0.6.2 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

compromised-package
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-credentials
abuses-pth
obfuscation
infostealer
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
exfiltration-crypto
files-exfiltration
destructive-actions

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.6.10.6.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

57f0e964aed446fe82998f13d1cbc577bff274378d980b551e4c134d093ab016

7ffadb379a36f079c04c109a57d7bd888bf0d7502f36ff8c3df9ecda3fb67930

6e8ebcdf5100410460ec1369bb802c607df008c5e2ca9f4f5fd16419ab47ce1b

a57a2241345578c03d830030fb02698ee1981ce4103d9116e7462134b0a1df87

1ee06d7aabbdf76969119c2f986e18bbc7f0dcac59ae9cae4f7a04798f2d083d

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pantheon-agents (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pantheon-agents across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pantheon-agents is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pantheon-agents was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pantheon-agents before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. pantheon-agents on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.6.1, 0.6.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-006183

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks pantheon-agents-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring