openai-mcpPyPI
Malicious code in openai-mcp (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package name and module structure impersonate the official openai Python SDK (the package even rewrites exported classes' __module__ attribute to "openai" in openai_mcp/__init__.py). Alongside the cloned SDK, it ships openai-setup.pth, which Python auto-loads on every interpreter start. The.pth file contains a single-line, heavily aliased exec() payload (single-letter names like _O, _T, _u, _s, _b, _z) that: (1) checks a one-shot guard /tmp/.bun_ran, (2) downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-<platform>-<arch>.zip to /tmp/b/bun and chmods it executable, (3) locates a sibling _index.js on sys.path, and (4) runs bun run _index.js. Because.pth files execute at every Python startup (not just at install), every python invocation after pip install openai-mcp downloads an alien runtime and executes the package's JavaScript payload through it — an alternate-runtime dropper that evades Python-only scanners. The obfuscation, one-shot guard, identity spoofing, and runtime-laundering together establish clear malicious intent.
Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an embedded infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collects all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.
It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
compromised-package
-
exfiltration-env-variables
-
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
-
exfiltration-credentials
-
abuses-pth
-
obfuscation
-
infostealer
-
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
-
exfiltration-crypto
-
files-exfiltration
-
destructive-actions
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for openai-mcp (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging openai-mcp across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
openai-mcp is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If openai-mcp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks openai-mcp before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst
Detect & block this
O3 blocks openai-mcp-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.