Which versions of open-clips-torch are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of open-clips-torch are flagged malicious: 95.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate open-clips-torch if I installed it?

open-clips-torch is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed open-clips-torch — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If open-clips-torch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is open-clips-torch part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — open-clips-torch is associated with the 2024-11-byted-dast campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find open-clips-torch across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for open-clips-torch (version 95.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging open-clips-torch across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

open-clips-torchPyPI

Malicious code in open-clips-torch (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-10720

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall open-clips-torch

What this malware does

A campaign of probably pentest packages flooding PYPI. Installing the package or importing the module triggers reporting basic info like hostname, path and the username to the package author. There is no other purpose of the package.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: 2024-11-byted-dast

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
typosquatting
dependency-confusion

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'open-clips-torch' @ 95.6 (pypi) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

95.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d7d88e4a49c08d9f895084d8191e23c3a88c26396f41fb3356ba7a5134659aef

51427fd13627790244c20595c056357e1143ada57d5d969d47923fa9568bf1d5

10d9dac2d506ba155492c5ada78ed91eb05119b7dda57f12c0d34c878c543aeb

1380b85689a21388d38481ba5783efac2b248ffeaa28dd49e2aa1cc563d0214d

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for open-clips-torch (version 95.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging open-clips-torch across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
open-clips-torch is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If open-clips-torch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks open-clips-torch before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. open-clips-torch on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 95.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2024-11-byted-dast

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks open-clips-torch-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring