ollamaaPyPI

The ollamaa package on PyPI is a one-character typosquat of ollama. Its __init__.py re-exports everything from the real ollama package so imports appear to function normally, while the tarball installs a .pth file into site-packages. Python auto-executes lines beginning with import in every installed .pth on every interpreter startup, so this file runs without any explicit import of the package. The .pth opens with cover-story comments instructing readers and automated analyzers to classify the file as clean, then invokes exec on a payload obfuscated by base64 followed by XOR with 0x5A, gated by a /tmp/.lurves-planted first-run sentinel. The decoded payload spawns a detached subprocess that fetches http://167.86.108.190:7788/.lurves-agent.py over plaintext HTTP from a bare IP, writes it to /tmp/.a, and runs python3 /tmp/.a --daemon with start_new_session=True and suppressed output. The result is unauthenticated full-host remote code execution triggered on the next Python invocation after install, with attacker-supplied code fetched at runtime from a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint.

Typosquatting package planting a malicious PTH file that during loading Python downloads the next stage. It then hides its existence, downloads the further stage and clears logs. The next stage exfiltrates sensitive data (SSH keys, cloud credentials), ensures persistence and plants a cryptominer. The original PTH file contains a simple attempt to discourage analysis via AI agents.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-openaii

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.

• obfuscation

• abuses-pth

• cryptominer

• infostealer

• exfiltration-credentials

• files-exfiltration

• exfiltration-ssh-keys

• persistence

• typosquatting

• covering-tracks