Which versions of okite are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of okite are flagged malicious: 0.0.7, 0.0.8. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate okite if I installed it?

okite is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed okite — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If okite was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is okite part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — okite is associated with the 2026-06-compr-woodpecker, IN-MAL-2026-006099, IN-MAL-2026-009510 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find okite across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for okite (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging okite across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

okitePyPI

Malicious code in okite (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5283

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall okite

What this malware does

The package installs okite-setup.pth, which Python auto-loads on every interpreter start. The.pth file contains a one-line obfuscated exec() of a string program (variables reduced to one- and two-character names like _o, _s, _u, _b, _z, _zf) that performs urllib.request.urlretrieve against https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip, extracts the Bun JavaScript runtime to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it 0755, and runs a sibling _index.js (with a glob fallback */_index.js) via subprocess as bun run _index.js. Execution is gated only by a /tmp/.bun_ran sentinel so it fires once per temp directory lifetime. The stated package purpose is "A Pythonic RPC package" — there is no legitimate reason an RPC library would fetch and execute an alternate language runtime, and routing the payload through Bun deliberately bypasses Python-level inspection of the actual behavior. The combination of (a) execution at every interpreter start via.pth abuse, (b) outbound fetch of a runtime from a third-party release host, (c) use of that runtime to execute a bundled JS file, and (d) heavy obfuscation in a file format that should contain only import statements is an unambiguous alternate-runtime-dropper pattern.

Versions 0.0.7, 0.0.8 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

compromised-package
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-credentials
abuses-pth
obfuscation
infostealer
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
exfiltration-crypto
files-exfiltration
destructive-actions

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.0.70.0.8

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

ec7e17ca2529781ce61d69b2d7e765c5e3e790d3ae2e2f187b006d710d7f9ed1

5cf921b48b1105a7a47b92fbf9fbcd24ed3445efedecc92aeb1d2fdfa13aa7fc

de64a279d3f974f903f8ed5a914b920a13bccf9ed2d6a3359f580015e483ce70

c5caf96fb4b9ce1d5947811ac97e0c1773c22bb1b3ac7170d91d8aabca3dfabd

3cc7d54b0e30e24367551e3f19ab7387cf397cf9e1b5889c9f04ff871c771c38

749d0d3816f36105bf53d90e6b4ab27514018851f7eb65628c943a94d4b1d9d5

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for okite (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging okite across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
okite is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If okite was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks okite before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. okite on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.0.7, 0.0.8 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-006099IN-MAL-2026-009510

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks okite-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring