Which versions of oclip are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of oclip are flagged malicious: 92.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate oclip if I installed it?

oclip is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed oclip — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If oclip was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is oclip part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — oclip is associated with the 2024-11-byted-dast campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find oclip across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for oclip (version 92.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging oclip across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

oclipPyPI

Malicious code in oclip (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-10594

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall oclip

What this malware does

A campaign of probably pentest packages flooding PYPI. Installing the package or importing the module triggers reporting basic info like hostname, path and the username to the package author. There is no other purpose of the package.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: 2024-11-byted-dast

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
typosquatting
dependency-confusion

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'oclip' @ 92.6 (pypi) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

92.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

c2d2c0992436650a40d64d021e56094cc48a801a15c5afaa60771bdc9e464f7e

0ef6501552dd6585f5c9189fdee9b7158e1e351fa6ac98be4048baa5129c7584

dc21e51bf306056c1f7386f6e7baeeec043f05fad768571f28624da41dd7b038

9d807179a533664d17e51887f6d21b0f0a8ecc444fee2cb216ee46168d7989fa

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for oclip (version 92.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging oclip across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
oclip is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If oclip was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks oclip before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. oclip on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 92.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2024-11-byted-dast

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks oclip-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring