Which versions of natazx are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of natazx are flagged malicious: 0.1.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate natazx if I installed it?

natazx is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed natazx — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If natazx was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is natazx part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — natazx is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-002630 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find natazx across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for natazx (version 0.1.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging natazx across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

natazxPyPI

Malicious code in natazx (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-3778

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall natazx

What this malware does

On import natazx, the package's top-level code executes several installer-hostile actions without consent: (1) it unconditionally overwrites the host's DNS configuration at /etc/resolv.conf (and the Termux equivalent) to point at 1.1.1.1/1.0.0.1 with aggressive timeouts — a system-wide change affecting every process on the host; (2) it runs pkill -9 tor and spawns a detached Tor daemon via start_new_session=True using a torrc written to /tmp/torrc, establishing a process that outlives the Python interpreter; (3) it shells out to pip install for five unpinned packages (colorama, requests, pycryptodome, urllib3, cfonts) bypassing declared dependencies (dependencies = [] in pyproject.toml), so the installer's environment is silently mutated with whatever the current PyPI releases are; (4) it fetches a JSON allowlist from a mutable GitHub main-branch ref (raw.githubusercontent.com/septianhdnatta/idd/refs/heads/main/device.json), builds a device fingerprint from serial number, build.prop, platform, uid, and timezone, and sys.exit(1)s if the installer's fingerprint is not on the author's list. The package's advertised function (main()) is a ToS-violating mass account-registration tool against Garena / Free Fire endpoints (100067.connect.garena.com, loginbp.ggblueshark.com, loginbp.common.ggbluefox.com) using hardcoded HMAC and AES-CBC keys, routed through 40 embedded HTTP proxy credentials on ten rotating IPs. The combination of import-time system-file destruction (resolv.conf overwrite), persistence (detached Tor daemon), silent environment mutation (unpinned pip installs), remote kill-switch (device-fingerprint allowlist on a mutable GitHub ref), and abuse-tool payload makes this package hostile to any environment in which it is installed.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d0514a0df660dfc4e7380f68e8533fa325ccc246ba21855975f73d3af78cd9f0

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for natazx (version 0.1.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging natazx across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
natazx is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If natazx was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks natazx before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. natazx on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-002630

References

pypi.org

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks natazx-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring