nagios-xiPyPI
Malicious code in nagios-xi (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On import nagios_xi, the package's __init__.py (lines 5-8) invokes socket.gethostbyname("atlass-check.autaeqjhfowvnnmkwhxjtq8x39d8nder1.oast.fun") inside a silent try/except. oast.fun is ProjectDiscovery's Interactsh out-of-band callback service; the DNS query itself is the exfiltration channel, confirming code execution on the installer's host and leaking the resolver IP to whoever controls the unique 32-character Interactsh subdomain. The package ships no actual functionality — it impersonates the Nagios XI commercial monitoring product (name nagios-xi, version 19.5.0 mimicking real Nagios XI versioning) while declaring an anonymous ProtonMail author (Coding Team <[email protected]>), a generic package utility description, and an empty README. The combination of brand impersonation, placeholder metadata, and an import-time OAST beacon as the package's sole behavior is reconnaissance for a supply-chain attack against developers searching for Nagios XI integrations.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for nagios-xi (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging nagios-xi across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
nagios-xi is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If nagios-xi was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks nagios-xi before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks nagios-xi-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.