mrmustardPyPI
Malicious code in mrmustard (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Versions 0.7.4 were compromised.
Compromised release has embedded code that during import exfiltrates sensitive data (selected environmental variables, credentials to AWS, SSH keys etc.) and ensures persistence via multiple ways: a cron entry, a malicious PTH file, and a shell configuration file. Persistence is diguished as "tensorflow hardware compatibility check" using file placed under ~/.cache/.tf_cache/hw_probe.pyc. The malicious version was uploaded after exfiltrating the PyPI token from the CI environment, likely after compromising the maintainer's Github account.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-compr-hw-probe
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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exfiltration-env-variables
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exfiltration-ssh-keys
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The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
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exfiltration-credentials
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persistence
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compromised-package
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abuses-pth
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mrmustard (version 0.7.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mrmustard across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
mrmustard is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If mrmustard was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mrmustard before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst
Detect & block this
O3 blocks mrmustard-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.