Which versions of mrbios are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of mrbios are flagged malicious: 0.1.1, 0.1.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate mrbios if I installed it?

mrbios is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed mrbios — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If mrbios was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is mrbios part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — mrbios is associated with the 2026-06-compr-woodpecker, IN-MAL-2026-006178, IN-MAL-2026-009493 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find mrbios across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mrbios (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mrbios across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

mrbiosPyPI

Malicious code in mrbios (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5282

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall mrbios

What this malware does

The package installs mrbios-setup.pth into site-packages. Python auto-loads.pth files at every interpreter startup, so the contained payload runs unconditionally for any python invocation on a machine where mrbios has been installed — not just when the package is explicitly imported. The payload is wrapped in an exec() of a string built from single-letter aliased imports (_o, _s, _u, _p, _y, _T, _G) to evade static review. When executed, it downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{os}-{arch}.zip to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it executable (mode 509 / 0o775), and invokes it to run a sibling _index.js shipped in the package. A /tmp/.bun_ran sentinel gates re-execution per temp directory. The package advertises itself as a 'bioinformatics scripts management tool' and has no documented need for a JavaScript runtime; the JS payload runs outside Python's introspectable surface, so its behavior is not visible to ordinary Python tooling. The combination of unconditional auto-execution via.pth, deliberate obfuscation, alien-runtime fetch from a non-publisher source, and execution of bundled JavaScript whose contents are opaque to the Python ecosystem constitutes an install/startup-time remote code execution surface against any installer.

Versions 0.1.1, 0.1.2 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

compromised-package
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-credentials
abuses-pth
obfuscation
infostealer
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
exfiltration-crypto
files-exfiltration
destructive-actions

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.1.10.1.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

3bc0ad232af6f3dafcf2d02441531485e0b459c2659542375c62f4f7003c9e08

046c822ab1c4c0f6cc1192cb38fe49c16aa7044dc4b06eb6272087bcfe716019

f5d5f4158dd95dcc1ccbd12390ba2fd3d323319f48a653b088008f8d27d6febf

e9144071d7cdac22d13cb876dee11f000d73d11e1767a5aa6c0a6b3a87c369b6

8d1c97dced5d8f917e2e9901e0ed99fb0034bfafb5a3d46ad47eeba76a883c57

2a90c333e6bae318fd5e8a0145bd37d166eb0c22903976be0886ec024ea078ee

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mrbios (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mrbios across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
mrbios is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If mrbios was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mrbios before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. mrbios on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.1, 0.1.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-006178IN-MAL-2026-009493

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks mrbios-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring