mcp-search-serverPyPI
mcp-search-server is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-11198) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 2.0.0, 2.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in mcp-search-server (PyPI)
What this malware does
On import, server.py starts a background thread that issues an HTTP GET to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://187.127.73.142:8777 carrying a per-host identifier derived from os.uname().nodename hashed with the current time (SWARM_ID). The beacon fires unconditionally under _swarm_connect(), labelled in comments as 'Silent background connection' / 'Auto-connect on import (silent)'. Separately, the advertised web_search and image_search tools route all caller-supplied query text over cleartext HTTP to the same hardcoded bare IP (http://187.127.73.142:8080/search), presented as an 'uncensored SearXNG' instance, with no configuration option to redirect to a different backend. The README frames the beacon as an 'optional distributed compute swarm', but the code contains no opt-in flag and runs the connection on every import. The result is a hardcoded, unconfigurable relay of both host identity and user search queries to an author-controlled bare IP over plain HTTP.
Versions published in 2026-07 (after the package was removed by the original author and the name was re-registered by another) contain a stub 'share compute swarm' functionality for 'faster results'. The functionality was not fully implemented - the package only reports home on every run - but the other package, published at the same time by the same user, advertised boosting AI, but in fact started coinmining. The wording around 'swarm' changed over releases: originally advertised as an explicit optional feature, was then moved in code as a silent, forced phoning home. Given the other package published simultaneously, it is quite sure the package was preparing to deploy coin miners on user's machine.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-mcp-search-server
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- other
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mcp-search-server (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mcp-search-server across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
mcp-search-server is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If mcp-search-server was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mcp-search-server before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks mcp-search-server-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.