Which versions of maxload are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of maxload are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.1.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate maxload if I installed it?

maxload is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed maxload — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If maxload was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is maxload part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — maxload is associated with the RLMA-2025-04196, 2025-07-maxload, RLUA-2026-00501 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find maxload across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for maxload (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging maxload across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

maxloadPyPI

Malicious code in maxload (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2025-41701

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall maxload

What this malware does

Running the module downloads, configure its startup and starts a remote executable. The exe is capable of sending files to a hardcoded Telegram channel, but this behavior seems not to be triggered during analysis

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2025-07-maxload

Reasons (based on the campaign):

Downloads and executes a remote executable.
peristence-autorun
A Telegram webhook is used to send collected data.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.0.01.0.11.1.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

3e69501ecfd0090c520f83139f91ae01a23e03762102a35ba89e4f33529d2fab

88935b76b4ded2fd46603849dd7e209b7e17dda08d278b09bfdd86d19dd60b66

09b392bd35def14bcd622e3863dec62ba92d26ef152cc81e657cb2c2194b93a8

7e293a4272004e92d4b4bbcc9d6d4c8a04bd28090c7800f1f3bafdce21be9d24

281b953465938c810a514a4c83ef3c86482ad7bd6f3583bd9686879ff0d10c2b

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for maxload (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging maxload across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
maxload is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If maxload was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks maxload before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. maxload on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.1.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2025-041962025-07-maxloadRLUA-2026-00501

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks maxload-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring