make-helperPyPI
make-helper is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-10991) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in make-helper (PyPI)
What this malware does
On import dev_helper, the package's init.py starts a daemon thread that runs decryptor.decrypt_and_run(): it fetches an AES-GCM key from the hardcoded endpoint https://key-2qfm.vercel.app/api/key, decrypts the shipped dev_helper/encrypted.bin (16.9 KB ciphertext, nonce prepended), and executes the plaintext via exec(plaintext, {'name': 'main'}). The auto-start is gated to skip interactive Python sessions and PYTHONSTARTUP contexts, so the payload fires in CI and production imports but stays hidden from REPL inspection. Logging is disabled (logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL)) and errors are swallowed. The package's stated purpose ("a helpful developer utility") does not disclose any of this, and the true payload is opaque without the remote key, allowing the operator of key-2qfm.vercel.app to rotate the executed code at will.
The package embeds encrypted code that, during import, is decrypted using an externally sourced password. The recovered code is executed and starts a bot capable of exfiltrating local files.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-make-helper
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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files-exfiltration
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obfuscation
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uses-telegram-bot
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for make-helper (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging make-helper across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
make-helper is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If make-helper was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks make-helper before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks make-helper-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.