Which versions of magicwolf are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of magicwolf are flagged malicious: 1.1.8, 1.1.9, 1.2.0, 1.2.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate magicwolf if I installed it?

magicwolf is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed magicwolf — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If magicwolf was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is magicwolf part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — magicwolf is associated with the 2026-02-magichat campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find magicwolf across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for magicwolf (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging magicwolf across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

magicwolfPyPI

Malicious code in magicwolf (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-898

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall magicwolf

What this malware does

The package is prepared to download a hardcoded executable and save it in %LOCALAPPDATA% under a very generic name, clearly aiming to hide its existence. Code is also prepared to alter MarkOfTheWeb, start as admin and run the executable, but in analyzed versions this behavior was not triggered in any existing code path. The downloading will happen e.g. on starting the declared command line.

Remote executables are standalone applications or installators, including ClickOnce installators. However, in the analysis attempts, none of them showed clear malicious behavior, in most cases crashing during the analysis. Captured network traffic shows communication with the remote server and likely expects the URL of the next stage, which was not delivered from the server. Additionally, the code embeds a separate path for execution on non-Windows machines. It attempts to execute a remote script, but in analyzed versions, the domain used is already suspended and not reachable.

In newer packages the remote code is another downloader, which then downloads a PyInstaller-packed executable that just calls back home but has no more functionality.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-02-magichat

Reasons (based on the campaign):

Downloads and executes a remote executable.
other
typosquatting

Malicious versions

4 flagged

1.1.81.1.91.2.01.2.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

e32a55043a4f5bcd7a9431d2abe5da0b940b3e345f255706139bd9810ad5dc24

490a95aace31b3b98d13cb980c9ee45e50df7f603dd7e295f9f6f03f2fdaf731

3d4f256ccd65da42e297351fbc7c15d4f3b25789c362d0d3419d580c4e07bf34

1d62d8ff07c018ee8b0e5828d06988eb55c3feca713bcb4da13e286fcac415e3

9949e473cbe4e567e4f35b40187d8811a4ef1a4cb2e1abe44a5c0ca9150d4b50

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for magicwolf (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging magicwolf across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
magicwolf is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If magicwolf was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks magicwolf before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. magicwolf on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.1.8, 1.1.9, 1.2.0, 1.2.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-02-magichat

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks magicwolf-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring