Which versions of magichat are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of magichat are flagged malicious: 0.1.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.0.4, 1.0.5, 1.0.6, 1.0.7, 1.0.8, 1.0.9, 1.1.0, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.8, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.5. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate magichat if I installed it?

magichat is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed magichat — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If magichat was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is magichat part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — magichat is associated with the 2026-02-magichat campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find magichat across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for magichat (17 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging magichat across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

magichatPyPI

Malicious code in magichat (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-878

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall magichat

What this malware does

The package is prepared to download a hardcoded executable and save it in %LOCALAPPDATA% under a very generic name, clearly aiming to hide its existence. Code is also prepared to alter MarkOfTheWeb, start as admin and run the executable, but in analyzed versions this behavior was not triggered in any existing code path. The downloading will happen e.g. on starting the declared command line.

Remote executables are standalone applications or installators, including ClickOnce installators. However, in the analysis attempts, none of them showed clear malicious behavior, in most cases crashing during the analysis. Captured network traffic shows communication with the remote server and likely expects the URL of the next stage, which was not delivered from the server. Additionally, the code embeds a separate path for execution on non-Windows machines. It attempts to execute a remote script, but in analyzed versions, the domain used is already suspended and not reachable.

In newer packages the remote code is another downloader, which then downloads a PyInstaller-packed executable that just calls back home but has no more functionality.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-02-magichat

Reasons (based on the campaign):

Downloads and executes a remote executable.
other
typosquatting

Malicious versions

17 flagged

0.1.01.0.11.0.21.0.31.0.41.0.51.0.61.0.71.0.81.0.91.1.01.1.11.1.21.1.81.2.21.2.31.2.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

016f12f6cc3656294be9c8d11c1d07ef953f6c204a9d76b1d5ab21b8ad87b2a1

42cf9a8fdfde42b15f94ed81efe1d74f692ce738f3819978b6760e46faf1e95c

b44e51035841826fb293ba041756cd9e79a7053fbb129e71a28b0a871639fe94

a77c3922633d4ba65720dabe7737b3ae2afcbbf6ba28435f18ef85c3289f2c92

4754a873c6958d4680b59b9d98e03fb41e3fdc385435ff25521ba66954939171

a289f82c228f5a5f94ee1def892419c183d51df46b8641ee9f3b8f61c1f3c512

b999f3f5762dc9bcb0dc2e91ef10116a368aca535d2f07fa2519e8d64bbc0902

668588c330e86554b72215b80a6c5a616ca3e52e9bd70d63314e5946b32f71fd

aeb58095dad868ee55be1c9ff8866335ef2b6b68449765834aaf67549a604ea0

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for magichat (17 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging magichat across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
magichat is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If magichat was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks magichat before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. magichat on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.0.4, 1.0.5, 1.0.6, 1.0.7, and 9 more flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-02-magichat

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst

Detect & block this

O3 blocks magichat-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring