Which versions of magic3d are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of magic3d are flagged malicious: 9.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate magic3d if I installed it?

magic3d is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed magic3d — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If magic3d was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is magic3d part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — magic3d is associated with the RLMA-2024-11082, 2024-11-byted-dast, RLUA-2026-00486 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find magic3d across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for magic3d (version 9.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging magic3d across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

magic3dPyPI

Malicious code in magic3d (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-11628

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall magic3d

What this malware does

A campaign of probably pentest packages flooding PYPI. Installing the package or importing the module triggers reporting basic info like hostname, path and the username to the package author. There is no other purpose of the package.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: 2024-11-byted-dast

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
typosquatting
dependency-confusion

Malicious versions

1 flagged

9.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

972f1c296c464ff9aae08ed32683d37a783645d34abc822aa50df6f76559ebce

79c4e67bf6a520bd91fbab23c859632362d455b2084a36624d3c034ad3f30419

d592ab222cd170236727db6adf8e6e314fda837b6aa1f6c81ea9baea714395dc

08cd16a6b3ceb1a9668b02bb7da892ec10846ca3f108510827f55835fb67e988

84c474ebc48fe10fe04924cf88cd5373881d1c34c51d3841f13f2f13ffea1617

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for magic3d (version 9.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging magic3d across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
magic3d is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If magic3d was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks magic3d before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. magic3d on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 9.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2024-110822024-11-byted-dastRLUA-2026-00486

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks magic3d-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring