Which versions of lognest are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of lognest are flagged malicious: 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.1.2, 0.1.3, 0.1.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate lognest if I installed it?

lognest is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed lognest — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If lognest was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is lognest part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — lognest is associated with the 2026-05-lognest, IN-MAL-2026-003865, IN-MAL-2026-003866, IN-MAL-2026-003874 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find lognest across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for lognest (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging lognest across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

lognestPyPI

Malicious code in lognest (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4227

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall lognest

What this malware does

On import lognest, the package's init.py spawns a detached background subprocess running a sibling _check.py (lognest/init.py:25 subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, os.path.join(base_dir, "_check.py")], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)). That script enters an infinite loop POSTing to https://pypkg.dev/project/logger/json — a lookalike of pypi.org — with TLS verification explicitly disabled via ssl._create_unverified_context() (lognest/_check.py:22). On the first request it exfiltrates the absolute install path (Path(__file__).resolve().parent) which typically encodes the installer's username, virtualenv layout, or CI runner path (lognest/_check.py:18). Server responses are base64-decoded and dispatched on background threads (lognest/_check.py:31), giving the operator a persistent C2 channel for delivering second-stage payloads to any process that imports the package. None of this behavior matches the package's advertised purpose as a logger. The combination of import-time background process, lookalike non-publisher host, TLS-disable, install-path exfiltration, and base64-decoded response dispatch is an unambiguous attacker-controlled remote-execution channel.

Package silently executes remote code during import.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-05-lognest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.

Malicious versions

5 flagged

0.1.00.1.10.1.20.1.30.1.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

8a52e16511fcccbee8bfd9e44dca8d6a3b5927bd5e66cf6fc7b849900c71ed9f

8bf5b7affdac26cee7e47cb0c56901faeb02d82c49aa5fb7b1f868b83a9d3fd5

1e3cfa27d08fbc958fff6e818a6ea1b9c36dce3c695a115fa40e5199fe4b87aa

481f45cde243009853b52b584fb6a1af2eae31e637912c8b78f18a8d7ee0d9d0

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for lognest (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging lognest across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
lognest is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If lognest was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks lognest before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. lognest on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.1.2, 0.1.3, 0.1.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-05-lognestIN-MAL-2026-003865IN-MAL-2026-003866IN-MAL-2026-003874

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks lognest-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring