litellmPyPI
Advisory published Updated
litellm is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-2144) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.82.7, 1.82.8, 1.107.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in litellm (PyPI)
What this malware does
litellm 1.107.0, uploaded to PyPI on 2026-10-21 between 11:39 and 11:40 UTC, contains a credential stealer and a remote code execution backdoor that are not in the upstream source (the v1.107.0 git tag of BerriAI/litellm does not contain them): they were injected at build or upload time. Every wheel ships three extra files under litellm-1.107.0.data/purelib/, which pip installs at the site-packages root, so the payload is triggered at every Python interpreter start, without importing litellm.
- cook.pth contains
import cook. - cook.py runs
exec(zlib.decompress(base64.b64decode(...))), an info stealer (self-named "privcollect") that collects browser passwords and history, SSH keys, shell history, AWS/GCP/Azure credentials and cloud instance metadata (169.254.169.254, 169.254.170.2), Kubernetes, Docker, Vault and CI secrets, AI developer tool configurations (~/.cursor, ~/.claude, ~/.kiro, Windsurf), GPG and TLS private keys, .npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials and environment variables, encrypts them with an embedded RSA-4096 key and POSTs them to http://www.litellm.dev/healthcheck. It leaves the marker /tmp/.pc_once_72129118c59f5636c0bb. - sitecustomize.py daemonizes at interpreter start and, every hour, fetches a domain list from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/letters9813/pythonclient-test/main/domain.txt, then downloads and executes code from http://<domain>/codepy (remote shell / dropper).
The same mechanism (a .pth file run at interpreter start) was used in litellm 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 (MAL-2026-2144). Releases 1.106.2 and 1.107.0rc1/rc2 are not affected. Any environment where 1.107.0 was installed should be treated as compromised and its credentials rotated.
litellm 1.107.0 is a Python LLM gateway/proxy library. No install-time or import-time code paths were observed that exfiltrate installer secrets, fetch and execute remote payloads, open a backdoor, redirect the installer's package manager, or distribute live third-party credentials. No lifecycle hooks performing network I/O, no.pth side effects beyond sys.path handling, and no credential-harvesting primitives against installer-owned paths (~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.npmrc, browser or wallet stores) were found in the shipped artifact.
LiteLLM was compromised through trivy security scan in a GitHub workflow. Attackers uploaded malicious versions of LiteLLM to PyPI. The malicious code would exfiltrate sensitive secrets to an attcker controlled domain.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'litellm' @ 1.82.8 (pypi) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for litellm (3 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
litellm is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If litellm was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
- Timothe Boulet · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks litellm-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.