libhmacPyPI
Advisory published Updated
libhmac is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-4194) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.3.0, 0.8.28.0, 0.8.28.1…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in libhmac (PyPI)
What this malware does
The PyPI name 'libhmac' matches the well-known libyal/libhmac C forensics library (HMAC primitive), but the package contents have nothing to do with HMAC primitives. The shipped code is a complete Chromium-family browser-extension hijacking toolkit. ChromeManager.ReplaceInPlaceExtensions (src/libhmac/extension_patcher.py) enumerates all Chrome/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi profiles for the current user, copies attacker payload bytes (dm_core_bg.js, dm_core_bg.wasm) into each extension's version directory, rewrites manifest.json to add <all_urls> host permissions and a relaxed content_security_policy (wasm-unsafe-eval, broad connect-src), strips extensions.ui.developer_mode_encrypted_hash from Chrome's Secure Preferences (src/libhmac/preferences_handler.py:84), and recomputes Chrome's super_mac using the per-browser HMAC seed extracted from resources.pak (src/libhmac/hmac_calculator.py:223) to defeat tamper detection. The advertised purpose in pyproject.toml is 'Chromium extension host sync, CSP relaxation, and in-place extension patching'. Author metadata is a placeholder ('libhmac maintainers', no email, no homepage, no repo) under a 'Proprietary' license. A developer who runs pip install libhmac expecting the libyal HMAC library instead pulls in a browser-compromise toolkit; downstream packages can import libhmac to weaponize any installer's browser profiles. The combination of name impersonation of an established OSS library, anonymous maintainer identity, and offensive capability with no legitimate dual-use framing is the fingerprint of namespace-abuse malware infrastructure.
The package is a loader of an infostealer that modifies browser extensions to intercept credentials and cryptowallet data. The installation is not automatic, the code is intended to be triggered externally, but includes hardcoded exfiltration target.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-05-libhmac
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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crypto-related
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exfiltration-credentials
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exfiltration-crypto
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exfiltration-browser-data
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for libhmac (4 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
libhmac is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If libhmac was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks libhmac-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.