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Malicious package

jupiterhelperPyPI

Malicious code in jupiterhelper (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-10038
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
pip uninstall jupiterhelper

What this malware does

Once run, downloads and install from sleipnirbrowser[.]org a suspicious executable pretending to be a webbrowser. This website appears to be a scam using some kind of crypto tokens, and trying to impersonate a legitimate Slepnir web browser (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleipnir_(web_browser)).

Later versions switched to install a software identified as LUMMA infostealer (e.g. https://tria.ge/240817-whze2aydkc), hidden in different executables

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2024-08-sleipnirbrowser-web3

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • Downloads and executes a remote executable.

  • dependency-confusion

  • crypto-related

  • modify-system-without-consent

  • impersonation

Malicious versions

4 flagged
0.1.10.1.20.1.30.1.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

f4c2ed44682d9e8aeb0af5c089ded63e048d20cad21f6692eb54fcfcf4e5a914
16159e1e7d5967a767a15190ad93bd78c25a28da00f1dd2a0f3ab84b4a346227
5a8e36ac6c995bb1a6fa9de762d459e8a108754dba767f6f3d19c385eb005b5e
9bfe828fbb3a38cecdbf60b2101bb45c7ca49059289ce6329eca0a11b6b15a09
638f3577106c1e317d78e6dafd3081305f1b8577a36ef193222c21d7762d1441

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for jupiterhelper (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging jupiterhelper across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    jupiterhelper is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If jupiterhelper was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks jupiterhelper before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. jupiterhelper on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.1, 0.1.2, 0.1.3, 0.1.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2024-084312024-08-sleipnirbrowser-web3RLUA-2026-00443

References

Credits

  • Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
  • ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks jupiterhelper-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

jupiterhelper (PyPI) malicious package — MAL-2024-10038 | O3 Security