Which versions of jupiter-helper are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of jupiter-helper are flagged malicious: 0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate jupiter-helper if I installed it?

jupiter-helper is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed jupiter-helper — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If jupiter-helper was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is jupiter-helper part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — jupiter-helper is associated with the RLMA-2024-08429, 2024-08-sleipnirbrowser-web3, RLUA-2026-00442 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find jupiter-helper across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for jupiter-helper (version 0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging jupiter-helper across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

jupiter-helperPyPI

Malicious code in jupiter-helper (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-10037

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall jupiter-helper

What this malware does

Once run, downloads and install from sleipnirbrowser[.]org a suspicious executable pretending to be a webbrowser. This website appears to be a scam using some kind of crypto tokens, and trying to impersonate a legitimate Slepnir web browser (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleipnir_(web_browser)).

Later versions switched to install a software identified as LUMMA infostealer (e.g. https://tria.ge/240817-whze2aydkc), hidden in different executables

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2024-08-sleipnirbrowser-web3

Reasons (based on the campaign):

Downloads and executes a remote executable.
dependency-confusion
crypto-related
modify-system-without-consent
impersonation

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

85476aad67eeb983a4fd4f09149b637779dad20842f699c233df19ed7e7716b9

c481cac8f5cd824d290825d377332b6e9c6657c14379cf51717bae3365f5df9d

3649d8b83ed867b05ae6721bd1158879d8e6a13e0ea9d80c7b6bd9d028dd8738

48481802c64f6a6bfec9d475e2413594b82eefb426fda33e9cd0715d985c83df

8979218fdaed88c165cffe1d07ba9cf96255a7e0cce69a93614f9479a17a55ea

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for jupiter-helper (version 0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging jupiter-helper across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
jupiter-helper is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If jupiter-helper was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks jupiter-helper before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. jupiter-helper on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2024-084292024-08-sleipnirbrowser-web3RLUA-2026-00442

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks jupiter-helper-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring