inlifegramPyPI
Malicious code in inlifegram (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
InLifeGram distributes a modified copy of the pyrogram Telegram client library and installs it into the top-level pyrogram import namespace, so import pyrogram after installation resolves to this fork. The fork's Client start path has been modified to lazily import a sibling module (from. import app as secret) and, when the authenticated account is a bot (self.me.is_bot), call secret.init(self) wrapped in a bare except Exception: pass. The call hands the fully authenticated client object — containing the bot token, api_id/api_hash, and MTProto auth_key — to undocumented code. The receiving app.py module consists of a single exec(zlib.decompress(base64.b85decode(b'...')).decode()) over an ~11KB opaque blob, with no other functionality and an Indonesian-language header threatening anyone who removes 'credits'. The multi-layer obfuscation (base85 → zlib → exec), the silent invocation on bot authentication, and the bare-except suppression are the canonical shape of a session/token-stealing backdoor. README links a sibling project VLife-Gram by the same author, indicating a family of trojanized forks. Any program that installs InLifeGram and runs a Pyrogram bot will silently surrender its bot session to the hidden payload on every successful login.
The modified version of a Telegram bot library. The obfuscated code, launched when the user starts their own bot application, attaches malicious backdoor commands to the Telegram bot. They allow hardcoded users to execute any commands in the bot's environment.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-inlifegram
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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clones-real-package
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obfuscation
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The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine.
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rat
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target:telegram
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action-hidden-in-lib-usage
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backdoor
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for inlifegram (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging inlifegram across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
inlifegram is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If inlifegram was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks inlifegram before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks inlifegram-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.