icingaPyPI
Malicious code in icinga (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
PyPI package 'icinga' at version 99.1.0 is a dependency-confusion / typosquat lure against the Icinga monitoring project. It ships no real functionality (generic description 'Operational package utility', placeholder author 'Dev') and exists only to run an install-time beacon. setup.py defines a CustomInstall command that, after install.run(self), collects host identifiers (COMPUTERNAME / uname nodename, current working directory, OS info, and the internal IP obtained via a UDP socket trick to 8.8.8.8) and POSTs them as JSON, tagged 'pypi-tg' / 'icinga', to a base64-encoded URL (aHR0cHM6Ly9weXRob24tbG9nLmxhcHhhMzU0LndvcmtlcnMuZGV2Lw== → https://python-log.lapxa354.workers.dev/) decoded at runtime via base64.b64decode and dispatched with urllib.request.urlopen. Exceptions are suppressed to keep the install silent. The implausibly high version number (99.1.0) is a classic dependency-confusion technique to outrank legitimate internal mirrors of an 'icinga' name. Installer impact: any machine running pip install icinga (CI runner, developer workstation, internal build host) leaks its hostname, internal IP, working directory, and OS to the attacker — confirming the typosquat lands and seeding follow-up targeted attacks.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for icinga (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging icinga across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
icinga is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If icinga was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks icinga before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks icinga-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.