Which versions of huggingleg are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of huggingleg are flagged malicious: 0.1, 0.2, 0.21, 0.22. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate huggingleg if I installed it?

huggingleg is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed huggingleg — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If huggingleg was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is huggingleg part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — huggingleg is associated with the RLMA-2024-11064, 2024-11-huggingleg, RLUA-2026-00405 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find huggingleg across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for huggingleg (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging huggingleg across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

hugginglegPyPI

Malicious code in huggingleg (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-11611

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall huggingleg

What this malware does

Package use a name similar to a known service and automatically attempt do download and run a remote executable.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2024-11-huggingleg

Reasons (based on the campaign):

Downloads and executes a remote executable.
dependency-confusion

Malicious versions

4 flagged

0.10.20.210.22

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

bd3fc7b63789f4251a960208908fc355246f5b9f285ca622255f6249bfccee33

53cc00cb853feb11f1b43a41b33107b735df733419302e66e69dc63197bfae30

15016c2674d699af66ab871a07440b7fbd48d3ee267381ff8eb36ef1436df2c0

681b6bba573e494515f30b4f8c45dc4182a0a329db1085975a71920f1440832d

72de10e32a474af344bc91f7a7d3243317206aa224f8d1ab563b537674c83c59

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for huggingleg (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging huggingleg across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
huggingleg is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If huggingleg was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks huggingleg before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. huggingleg on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1, 0.2, 0.21, 0.22 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2024-110642024-11-hugginglegRLUA-2026-00405

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks huggingleg-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring