httpprobePyPI
Malicious code in httpprobe (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as an 'HTTP probing tool for security researchers' but contains no HTTP-probing functionality. Its only behavior is to fetch and execute a Windows PE binary named 'mirai_agent.exe' from a hardcoded Tor hidden service (sytej5umomwukd77aantkxqj4aoke3kfist6eyne2pngavgsakum3iid.onion), with a localhost fallback. Two independent execution paths deliver the payload: (1) setup.py overrides the install command with a PostInstall class that spawns a background thread on pip install to download the binary, write it to a Microsoft-look-alike path under %TEMP%/MS/Update/agent.exe, set hidden+system file attributes via SetFileAttributesW, and launch it via CreateProcessW with CREATE_NO_WINDOW; (2) httpprobe/init.py exposes a main() that performs the same fetch-stage-hide-execute sequence at import time via CreateProcessW or subprocess.Popen. The duplicated install-time and import-time execution paths ensure code execution on the installer's Windows machine regardless of whether the package is installed or later imported by a consumer. The Microsoft-look-alike staging path, hidden+system attributes, no-window flag, and Tor-only delivery are all consistent with intent to persist an attacker-controlled binary on the developer's machine.
If run as a module and during installation, the package attempts to download and start an executable described as a Mirai agent. During analysis, the Onion website hosting executable was not available. Using Onion and localhost fallback suggests the package was not yet ready to deliver malicious actions to the end users.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-httpprobe
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for httpprobe (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging httpprobe across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
httpprobe is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If httpprobe was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks httpprobe before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks httpprobe-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.