hello-dynamicPyPI
Malicious code in hello-dynamic (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
hello-dynamic 0.1.2 is a near-empty package whose init.py only defines a hello() function printing 'Hello!'. Its setup.cfg declares a dependency_links entry pointing at a webhook.site UUID endpoint (https://webhook.site/56557fe9-5bcf-4f26-bed7-38f772525011/pypi/aliga-raison). webhook.site is a generic HTTP-callback inspector commonly used to receive beacon traffic. Modern pip ignores dependency_links, so installer harm is minimal in practice, but the artifact's shape — trivial code, no real functionality, install metadata pointing at a request-inspector endpoint named after a PyPI package — is consistent with a reconnaissance probe testing which installers still process dependency_links. No exfiltration, RCE, credential read, or persistence mechanism is present in the package code.
Package attempts to test exploitation via legacy dependency_links configuration
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for hello-dynamic (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging hello-dynamic across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
hello-dynamic is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If hello-dynamic was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks hello-dynamic before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks hello-dynamic-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.