Which versions of haproxy-config-client are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of haproxy-config-client are flagged malicious: 8.5.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate haproxy-config-client if I installed it?

haproxy-config-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed haproxy-config-client — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If haproxy-config-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is haproxy-config-client part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — haproxy-config-client is associated with the 2026-06-haproxy-config-client campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find haproxy-config-client across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for haproxy-config-client (version 8.5.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging haproxy-config-client across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

haproxy-config-clientPyPI

Malicious code in haproxy-config-client (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6748

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall haproxy-config-client

What this malware does

During installation the obfuscated code downloads a malicious executable from a remote location. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from c.lin.dl.wel1[.]ru. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.lin.dl.wel1[.]r and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The executable is finally saved under a partially random name, executed, and removed after execution. The Linux executable contacts a few domains, but there is no more detailed information about its behavior available.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-haproxy-config-client

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Downloads and executes a remote executable.
obfuscation
dependency-confusion
other
malware
covering-tracks
targetted-attack

Malicious versions

1 flagged

8.5.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

f3231df36fad882782125a817ad5881080ef595dc1941b5d77aac3c19e7b2bab

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for haproxy-config-client (version 8.5.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging haproxy-config-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
haproxy-config-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If haproxy-config-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks haproxy-config-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. haproxy-config-client on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 8.5.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-haproxy-config-client

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks haproxy-config-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring