Which versions of haaahhaha are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of haaahhaha are flagged malicious: 0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate haaahhaha if I installed it?

haaahhaha is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed haaahhaha — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If haaahhaha was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is haaahhaha part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — haaahhaha is associated with the RLMA-2024-11056, 2024-08-embeds-RealtekHDAudioManager, RLUA-2026-00371 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find haaahhaha across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for haaahhaha (version 0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging haaahhaha across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

haaahhahaPyPI

Malicious code in haaahhaha (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-11603

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall haaahhaha

What this malware does

Importing a module starts downloading and executing an infostealer, widely identified by AV/sandboxes.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2024-08-embeds-RealtekHDAudioManager

Reasons (based on the campaign):

infostealer
Downloads and executes a remote executable.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

59ac1bd3765fac3e0ed410105cc41613d2bb8bd2d118a605c372e7d4ef69c026

a7255fe903c93bce812921852ea02af725d77895ac4a662bb4b1eb0b3f68ec66

c8c6599371614e7710276d1475abae424b77a913aed8885e7191b0db82d96e40

37897ce37db09d4000962798ada87b975c045ee9e919501be030a472a8ae0bf9

fe990cfc28410a3357b79b0280363518aec9a374dd0743af19889bf64f10744b

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for haaahhaha (version 0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging haaahhaha across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
haaahhaha is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If haaahhaha was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks haaahhaha before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. haaahhaha on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2024-110562024-08-embeds-RealtekHDAudioManagerRLUA-2026-00371

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks haaahhaha-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring