Which versions of guan are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of guan are flagged malicious: 0.1.100, 0.1.171. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate guan if I installed it?

guan is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed guan — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If guan was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is guan part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — guan is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-002162, IN-MAL-2026-002127 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find guan across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for guan (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging guan across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

guanPyPI

Malicious code in guan (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-3692

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall guan

What this malware does

The top-level src/guan/__init__.py unconditionally calls statistics_of_guan_package() on every import guan. That function (in src/guan/others.py) opens a raw TCP socket to the hardcoded author-controlled endpoint socket.guanjihuan.com:12345 and sends a JSON payload containing the installer's MAC address (via uuid.getnode()), the guan package version, and timestamp. There is no opt-out, no documentation of this behavior in README/PKG-INFO, and no user consent. This constitutes silent collection of a stable hardware identifier from every machine that imports the package and transmits it to an author-controlled server — an installer-side data exfiltration pattern, not merely author-side self-harm. While the payload is narrow (MAC + version + time), MAC addresses are persistent hardware identifiers suitable for tracking, correlation, and deanonymization of developer/build machines.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.1.1000.1.171

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

2e04a9a658bc7616e72a5edf276dd049e5b697f2492c46929caf2e01fac95d84

79f5073a737071fced2f4ba5d1843bb5104253741c9e5f58bf2b773f06c05ada

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for guan (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging guan across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
guan is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If guan was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks guan before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. guan on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.100, 0.1.171 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-002162IN-MAL-2026-002127

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks guan-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring