Which versions of graphicctx are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of graphicctx are flagged malicious: 1.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate graphicctx if I installed it?

graphicctx is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed graphicctx — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If graphicctx was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is graphicctx part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — graphicctx is associated with the 2026-04-renderctx campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find graphicctx across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for graphicctx (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging graphicctx across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

graphicctxPyPI

Malicious code in graphicctx (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-3224

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall graphicctx

What this malware does

Packages in this campaign are used to exfiltrate data from users installing code from prepared Github repositories. Packages contain code to exfiltrate files (typically .env files, but it could also be log, txt or code files), and may also create a persistent backdoor via embedding a hardcoded SSH key or perform other actions. The malicious actions are not triggered via the code in malicious repositories pretending to be some early-stage cryptocurrency-related projects.

Based on the attribution of some NPM packages used in malicious repositories published under https://github.com/0xsebasneuron, this is likely part of North Korean actions targeting developers via fake interviews: https://socket.dev/supply-chain-attacks/north-korea-s-contagious-interview-campaign

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-04-renderctx

Reasons (based on the campaign):

backdoor
files-exfiltration
crypto-related
The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

8867133b18f35132bf0096bdbd5d1891e87f8a07bbba09f6dffe21c8b048596e

5234e380c4b7795a299a496ea15fb214e7fb439e74899c372ddb016ba3785485

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for graphicctx (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging graphicctx across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
graphicctx is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If graphicctx was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks graphicctx before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. graphicctx on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-04-renderctx

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst

Detect & block this

O3 blocks graphicctx-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring