gpseaPyPI
Malicious code in gpsea (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package gpsea version 0.9.14 contains a malicious .pth file (gpsea-setup.pth) that executes a Bun-based credential stealer on every Python startup via CPython's site.py exec() mechanism. The payload downloads the Bun runtime from the official GitHub release page, then runs an obfuscated JavaScript stealer that exfiltrates environment variables, .env files, SSH keys, and cloud credentials to an attacker-controlled GitHub repository. This is part of the Hades/Miasma campaign (also called Shai-Hulud), attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor.
Novel finding: gpsea/_index.js (same campaign) embeds CBRN-level dangerous-content text to trigger AI safety refusals in LLM-based security scanners, causing them to skip the file entirely.
C2 IP: 20.207.73.82 Sentinel file: /tmp/.bun_ran MITRE ATT&CK: T1546.018
The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code
Versions 0.9.14 were compromised.
Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.
It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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compromised-package
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exfiltration-env-variables
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exfiltration-cloud-tokens
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exfiltration-credentials
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abuses-pth
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obfuscation
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infostealer
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The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
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exfiltration-crypto
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files-exfiltration
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destructive-actions
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for gpsea (version 0.9.14). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging gpsea across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
gpsea is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If gpsea was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks gpsea before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst
- O3 Security · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks gpsea-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.