Which versions of google-play-store are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of google-play-store are flagged malicious: 0.6.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate google-play-store if I installed it?

google-play-store is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed google-play-store — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If google-play-store was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is google-play-store part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — google-play-store is associated with the 2024-09-old-google-play-store campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find google-play-store across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for google-play-store (version 0.6.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging google-play-store across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

google-play-storePyPI

Malicious code in google-play-store (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-12280

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall google-play-store

What this malware does

This is a copy of https://pypi.org/project/play-scraper/ with added a very questionable "telemetry": in scraper.py, L90 sends the user hostname, IP and the exact local ID of scraped application to the package author.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: 2024-09-old-google-play-store

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
dependency-confusion
action-hidden-in-lib-usage
clones-real-package

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.6.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

c0bd156480300a5c7b9a72d9863c6a67c8e1b9dcc0d9339fb5816d40e63a4a41

b0f8bc12f61546bde84dd1d7a64519fcdc55ce875b71f3d8d848d2d5daa2248d

f7f8c5c260db753b5480b4805737ac76d2e8ea89ba3ec410762eadfc5a788a9d

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for google-play-store (version 0.6.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging google-play-store across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
google-play-store is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If google-play-store was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks google-play-store before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. google-play-store on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.6.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2024-09-old-google-play-store

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)

Detect & block this

O3 blocks google-play-store-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring