goodoltoulasPyPI
Malicious code in goodoltoulas (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On pip install goodoltoulas, setup.py unconditionally invokes setup_helper(), which downloads an opaque PE binary from an anonymous file-hosting service (storage.filebin.net) into C:\MALWARE_DELETE\main.exe and launches it via subprocess.Popen with CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE. There is no hash check, signature verification, or version pinning, and the host is unrelated to any package publisher. The library surface is a thin decoy: init.py forwards all attribute access to the requests module and the README advertises 'A simple request cloner for Python', providing cover for the install-time dropper. The drop path uses a self-incriminating directory name (C:\MALWARE_DELETE) and the response carries application/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable, confirming hostile intent. Any Windows installer running pip install will execute attacker-controlled code immediately.
During installation, package attempts to download and run an executable imitating malicious activity.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: 2026-06-goodoldtoulas
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Destructive / sabotageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for goodoltoulas (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging goodoltoulas across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
goodoltoulas carries a destructive/sabotage payload. Remove it immediately, restore any affected data from clean backups, and verify integrity of build outputs that may have been tampered with.
Did it already run?
If goodoltoulas was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks goodoltoulas before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks goodoltoulas-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.