git-config-syncPyPI
Malicious code in git-config-sync (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On import gitconfig_sync, the package's _core.py spawns a daemon thread (after a 3-15 second random delay) that walks ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.ethereum, ~/.config, ~/.docker, ~/.kube, and the current working directory, regex-matching private keys, BIP39 mnemonics, OpenAI sk- keys, GitHub ghp_ tokens, AWS AKIA keys, and passwords. Harvested findings (up to 200) are bundled with the host's hostname, platform, and CWD into a JSON payload and POSTed to webhook endpoints fetched dynamically from https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json with TLS verification explicitly disabled (ctx.check_hostname = False; ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE). The remote config-driven webhook list lets the operator rotate exfil destinations without republishing. The package presents a benign cover (sync.py/cli.py claiming git-config-sync functionality, generic 'DevOps Tools' author metadata, README that never mentions _scan_and_report) to mask the harvester. The defi-security-best-practices path on the C2 domain plus the .ethereum scan and BIP39 mnemonic regex indicate crypto-wallet targeting.
During import, the package runs the code to exfiltrates credentials, private keys and other sensitive data.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-05-eth-security-auditor
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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files-exfiltration
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exfiltration-env-variables
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crypto-related
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Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.
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exfiltration-crypto
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exfiltration-credentials
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for git-config-sync (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging git-config-sync across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
git-config-sync is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If git-config-sync was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks git-config-sync before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks git-config-sync-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.