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Malicious package

funcdescPyPI

Malicious code in funcdesc (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5300
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
pip uninstall funcdesc

What this malware does

The package installs funcdesc-setup.pth, which Python auto-executes at interpreter startup for any environment where this package is installed. The.pth file is obfuscated with single-letter aliases (_O, _T, _G, _o, _s, _u,...) and wraps its real payload in exec() over an inline string, gated by a /tmp/.bun_ran sentinel. On first run it calls urllib.request.urlretrieve to download the Bun JavaScript runtime release archive from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-<platform>-<arch>.zip, extracts it to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it executable, and then invokes bun run _index.js against a bundled _index.js shipped inside the package. The advertised purpose of funcdesc is a Python function-description protocol; there is no legitimate reason for it to fetch and run an alternate JavaScript runtime, stage binaries in /tmp, or execute opaque bundled JS outside the documented Python API. The pattern (auto-loaded.pth, obfuscated exec, alternate-runtime dropper, mismatched purpose, in-file __version__ still reading 0.2.1) is consistent with a hijacked release rather than legitimate maintainer behavior. The harm fires automatically every time a Python interpreter starts in any environment where this version is installed, not only at pip install, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine.

Versions 0.2.2, 0.2.3 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • compromised-package

  • exfiltration-env-variables

  • exfiltration-cloud-tokens

  • exfiltration-credentials

  • abuses-pth

  • obfuscation

  • infostealer

  • The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.

  • exfiltration-crypto

  • files-exfiltration

  • destructive-actions

Malicious versions

2 flagged
0.2.20.2.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

c6f85c691f141dc4c962171ac49945286bb40e15cb8450d2f42d048a3f53bb22
72f65b090fe99d340a8b222992fa485d3b285c22d5ab062dfb982a714bad7d4d
cb003c7110c066c512861cf6f1fb69d124169cbf9af0e238b584f17ddd4603da
7054d870b3afb07fc18e6e4b8b91939e0c0586e6c8a98dd5217eebc0ab446595
4a5756a79331cdda67721e39889609f5c0b5e342b678dbce2de97c94ec2dbe29
1d6ccf801c88c538a181fc4246dc09fd20b429e5a702a1a79d290743c0e22b59

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for funcdesc (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging funcdesc across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    funcdesc is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If funcdesc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks funcdesc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. funcdesc on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.2.2, 0.2.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-005833IN-MAL-2026-009536

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder
  • Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks funcdesc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

funcdesc (PyPI) malicious package — MAL-2026-5300 | O3 Security