funcdescPyPI
Malicious code in funcdesc (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package installs funcdesc-setup.pth, which Python auto-executes at interpreter startup for any environment where this package is installed. The.pth file is obfuscated with single-letter aliases (_O, _T, _G, _o, _s, _u,...) and wraps its real payload in exec() over an inline string, gated by a /tmp/.bun_ran sentinel. On first run it calls urllib.request.urlretrieve to download the Bun JavaScript runtime release archive from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-<platform>-<arch>.zip, extracts it to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it executable, and then invokes bun run _index.js against a bundled _index.js shipped inside the package. The advertised purpose of funcdesc is a Python function-description protocol; there is no legitimate reason for it to fetch and run an alternate JavaScript runtime, stage binaries in /tmp, or execute opaque bundled JS outside the documented Python API. The pattern (auto-loaded.pth, obfuscated exec, alternate-runtime dropper, mismatched purpose, in-file __version__ still reading 0.2.1) is consistent with a hijacked release rather than legitimate maintainer behavior. The harm fires automatically every time a Python interpreter starts in any environment where this version is installed, not only at pip install, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine.
Versions 0.2.2, 0.2.3 were compromised.
Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.
It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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compromised-package
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exfiltration-env-variables
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exfiltration-cloud-tokens
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exfiltration-credentials
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abuses-pth
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obfuscation
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infostealer
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The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
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exfiltration-crypto
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files-exfiltration
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destructive-actions
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for funcdesc (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging funcdesc across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
funcdesc is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If funcdesc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks funcdesc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks funcdesc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.