fsociety-toolsPyPI
Malicious code in fsociety-tools (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On import, fsociety_tools/init.py loads tokens.py, which at module load time instantiates TokenManager(). The constructor concatenates eight large string chunks, base64-decodes the result, XOR-decrypts the bytes with key 66, writes the decoded Windows executable to %TEMP%\fsociety.tmp, and launches it via subprocess.Popen with shell=True and creationflags=0x08000000 (CREATE_NO_WINDOW) so no console window appears. The surrounding TokenManager/validate_token/TokenAPI scaffolding and the package's self-description as 'Security and penetration testing utilities for ethical hackers' (with a Mr. Robot themed author identity) are cover for the dropper: the advertised CLI only prints fake Discord-shaped tokens, while the real effect of import fsociety_tools (or invoking the installed fsociety console script, which imports the package) is materialization and silent execution of an opaque embedded PE on Windows. Splitting the payload across multiple variables, base64+XOR encoding, hidden-window execution, and a decoy benign API together constitute an unambiguous import-time binary dropper.
During import, package executes the embedded executable. It is an infostealer named internally as "NBSteal", focused on exfiltrating data from browsers, Telegram, Discord, Roblox and other gaming platforms, and other credentials.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-discord-token-generator
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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infostealer
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files-exfiltration
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obfuscation
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exfiltration-browser-data
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malware
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target:telegram
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exfiltration-credentials
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for fsociety-tools (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging fsociety-tools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
fsociety-tools is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If fsociety-tools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks fsociety-tools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks fsociety-tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.